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Information sharing has become eminent to supply 
chain management, as it allows supply chain 
partners to collaborate more closely. However, 
currently supply chain partners are often on disjoint 
information platforms, which prevent them from 
effectively sharing critical supply chain 
information. One of the main barriers of 
information sharing is revealing confidential 
information to unintended parties and thus the 
disclosure of privacy. Therefore the information 
sharing needs and characteristics of a supply chain 
has been analyzed and subsequently a cross 
platform privacy and security framework to allow 
safe information sharing has been proposed.  
 
Introduction 
Supply chain management (SCM) has become a 
much discussed topic and as believed by many, 
business does not compete on a product level any 
more, but business competes and differentiates on a 
supply chain level [1]. It is inevitable that 
information sharing is needed for businesses to 
cooperate and many argue that information sharing 
is a key ingredient for a successful SCM [2]. The 
advent of RFID technology takes the information 
sharing detail level to an even higher level, as it can 
provide information about the physical product 
movement on an item level. Basically, RFID allows 
supply chain partners to integrate the physical flow 
with the information flow.   
There are currently many service platforms to 
facilitate information sharing between supply chain 
partners. However, sharing information between 
these service platforms is not a common practice. 
There is therefore an urgent need to share 
information across these disjoined service 
platforms, as the number of service platforms 
expand. Privacy and security in its broadest sense is 
a barrier for companies to share information [3] [4]. 
In general, the privacy and security are in place for 
individual service platforms, but there lacks a 
privacy and security framework for sharing 
information across platforms. Thus in order to 
facilitate cross platform information sharing, a 
privacy and security framework needs to be 
developed first to lower the barrier of information 
sharing between supply chain partners.  
The objective of this study is to develop a 
privacy and security framework for cross platform 
information sharing for supply chain partners. In 
order to satisfy the supply chain needs, we analyze 
the information sharing requirements based on the 
following areas: 
• Supply chain information sharing issues 
and concerns on security and current 
measures typically in use, and,  
• Typical scenarios of supply chain 
management practices in the context of 
privacy and security.  
The paper is organized as follows: In the next 
section we provide an overview of information 
sharing across supply chains, subsequently we 
present the findings of our case study. Based on the 
case study, we propose a cross platform privacy and 
security framework to safeguard confidential 
information sharing. Moreover, the proposed 
platform is illustrated by a typical information 
sharing scenario. Finally, we conclude and give 
some remarks on our future work.  
 
Literature review 
There are currently many platforms available to 
share supply chain information. Many of the 
existing platforms focus on parts of information 
sharing, e.g. EPCglobal, focuses on RFID data and 
Dell’s VMI system focuses on suppliers. However, 
in order to gain visibility, supply chains partners 
may need information that reach beyond RFID data 
and beyond only the suppliers segment. [5][6] for 
instance described that inventory information 
sharing across the entire supply chain can lessen 
the order placing distortion, also known as the 
Forrester effect and the Bullwhip effect 
respectively. Therefore supply chains are in need 
for a platform and cross platform to share 
information among its supply chain partners.  
Information sharing across enterprise 
boundaries in supply chains involves many issues. 
In a generic supply chain, there are raw 
material/parts/semi-finished goods, suppliers, 
logistics services provider, manufacturers, 
wholesalers, retailers [7]. Wholesalers or retailers 
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process purchase orders to suppliers, and logistics 
services providers will deliver the requested 
materials to manufacturers and they will deliver the 
finished goods to wholesalers and then retailers. 
Back and forth information flow across these 
parties could sometimes happen on more than one 
supply chains. For example, a dye manufacturer 
order raw materials from a vendor, the information 
flow here impact both a garment brand store’s 
supply chain as well as a painting oil brand store’s 
supply chain. Such multi-parties and multi-supply 
chain scenario makes the information sharing more 
complicated, and the privacy issues arises here [8]. 
Other privacy concerns include specific 
products’ volume, relationship, and contracts, price, 
manufacturer’s customer contacts; the nature of 
relationship can be viewed as vendor-manufacturer 
[6], upstream-downstream partners, distribution 
center-retailer (warehouse charges), and retailer-
consumer (CRM) [9][10]. Most privacy-protecting 
schemes for RFID have focused on the consumer 
privacy problems. Industrial privacy, i.e. data 
secrecy and business confidentiality, is important 
too, but less frequently considered [11]. 
As aforementioned, supply chains can exist of 
many different supply chain partners. Usually 
supply chain partnership is characterized as a 
buyer-supplier relationship [12]. The supply chain 
partnership can vary from being fixed e.g. by 
contracts [13] to being dynamic e.g. ad hoc 
collaboration [14]. Fixed supply chain partnership 
has the characteristic of being lasting in which the 
relationship is clearly defined. Dynamic supply 
chain partnership on the other hand is ad hoc and 
can change from transaction to transaction. 
Therefore, dynamic partnership brings a new 
element to privacy and security in a supply chain 
context where it has to adapt to both the established 
and changing supply chain partnerships.  
 
Methodology 
The main objective of this study is to create a 
privacy and security cross platform information 
sharing framework for supply chains. However, the 
current literature lacks examples of how 
information is shared among supply chain partners 
and platform. Therefore a case study is used as an 
illustration of a typical supply chain. This research 
methodology is well suited for this problem, as it 
can bring out the problems that arise during 
information sharing. Moreover, case studies can 
provide information about a given context and 
eventually deduce theories from it [15].  
 
Case study 
For this study we studied a supply chain for power 
tools, e.g. power drills. The supply chain consists 
of a supplier, a manufacturer, a trader, and a 
retailer. The supplier and the manufacturer are both 
located in China, where the supplier provides the 
parts and accessories and where the manufacturer 
assembles the power tools. A trader, located in 
Hong Kong, functions as a middle man between the 
manufacturer and retailer to source, to WPK 
(warehousing packing kitting), and to ship the 
products to the retailer. Obviously, the trader does 
not actually perform the all the activities, e.g. WPK 
and the shipping. The trader outsources these 
activities to a 3PL and a carrier respectively. 
Finally, the retailer, located in the USA, owns 
several stores and DCs in order to sell the power 
tools to the consumers.  
The power tools supply chain partners are 
distributed among three platforms, with the 
manufacturer, trader, DC, and retailer as the main 
information sharing partners (see Figure 2).  
The manufacturer is on a platform called the 
“manufacturer platform” and on this platform the 
supplier can share information with the 
manufacturer, e.g. part delivery tracking 
information. Therefore the manufacturer can be 
considered as the data owner and where the 
supplier only provides information to the 
manufacturer.  
Figure 1. Case - supply chain setting
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Furthermore, the trader is on a platform called 
the “trader platform” and where the 3PL and 
carrier can share information with the trader, 
e.g. shipping tracking. Trucker A and 
warehouse X in their turn can share information 
with the 3PL, e.g. warehouse receipt 
confirmation, who subsequently can pass  
 
 
Figure 2. Case - Supply chain information 
sharing infrastructure 
through the data to the trader. Therefore the trader 
can be considered as the data owner and where the 
3PL, carrier, trucker A, and warehouse X only 
provides information to the trader. 
Finally, the DC and the retailer are on the 
“retailer platform”. Store, trucker B and warehouse 
Y can provide information to the DC and retailer, 
e.g. inventory status. Therefore the Retailer and DC 
can be considered as the data owner and where the 
store, trucker B, and warehouse Y only provides 
information to the retailer. 
Currently, the information sharing between 
platforms are performed manually, e.g. by email, 
phone, and fax. The data that needs to be shared is 
in general already detailed by means of contracts. 
The depicted supply chain (Figure 2) shows that 
the supply chain partners already share information 
within their supply chain segment (platform), but  
 
 
cross platform information sharing is less well 
established. The information sharing between data 
owners, and in this case the major supply chain 
partners, are generally predetermined by contracts, 
and in some cases by ad hoc project, and can 
usually be obtained manually.  However, there are 
cases, where for instance warehouse X needs 
information of the DC. In such case, this 
information sharing might not be covered by 
contracts, as they might not even be aware that they 
are within the same supply chain, and the trial to 
obtain the particular information can become a 
dreadful process. First warehouse X needs to 
contact the 3PL, who needs to contact the trader 
and who in its turn, contacts the DC for the 
particular information. Subsequently, the 
information has to travel the same path backwards 
to deliver the information to warehouse X.  
 
Cross platform privacy and security 
framework 
We propose the following cross platform privacy 
and security framework (CPPF), in order to allow 
supply chain partners seamlessly share information 
across platforms. The proposed CPPF must have 
the following in place: 
Cross platform environment – There exists 
a technology that allows us to single uniquely 
identify (SUI) each item, e.g. similar to EPC code 
for RFID information and MAC address for 
computer network cards. Moreover, there exist 
some form of 3rd party e-service [16] that can 
discover per SUI request of all platforms that 
contain information about the SUI. For now we call 
this service the SUI discovery service (SUI-DS). 
Some Internet-aware addressing form will be 
provided as a pointer to the platform containing the 
SUI data. Let us take the Object Name Service 
(ONS) of EPCglobal as an example of how this is 
performed for RFID data [17].  
Information portal – Each portal knows 
three roles 1) Sole Operator (SO), which is the 
platform itself, e.g. manufacturer platform as 
described by the aforementioned case study 2) Data 
Owner (DO), the supply chain partner who owns 
the data, e.g. manufacturer as described in the 
aforementioned case study, and 3) 3rd Party 
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Contributor (3PC), the supply chain partners who 
act as data providers, e.g. the supplier in the 
manufacturer platform as described in the 
aforementioned case study 
Data dimension – For the CPPF we 
categorize the data by their data dimensions, which 
include location, sensitivity, and ownership. Data 
can be stored in different locations, e.g. local 
database, intranet, and Internet, and we assume that 
information stored on the platform are considered 
as information that can be shared with selected 
supply chain partners. Data sensitivity implies that 
data can be classified according to different 
sensitivity levels, e.g. high, medium, and low. 
Where high sensitivity contains item specific data 
that can reveal “trade secrets” and these data 
should only be shared with close supply chain 
partners. While low sensitive data contains generic 
data and can be shared with less close supply chain 
partners. Finally, data ownership in this framework 
includes the roles as described above, namely data 
owner and third party. The reader is referred to 
[18][19][20] for further readings about the data 
dimensions.  
Privacy preference – This is the preference 
of the requested information provider in terms of 
privacy protection when sharing information [21], 
meaning what information to share with what type 
of relationship, e.g. sharing of high sensitive data 
with “close” supply chain partners and sharing of 
low sensitive data with indirect supply chain 
partners. The privacy preference concept is initially 
developed to collect personal information of any 
user [22] and in this project we extent the concept  
Figure 3. Cross platform privacy and security 
framework 
 
to a B2B context. Thus each supply chain partner 
can specify sharing information preference, for 
different types of supply chain partners. The data 
sharing is determined based on the privacy 
preference at the time of data request and therefore 
can support both fixed and dynamic relationships 
[21].  
Security Scheme – One party is the receiver 
(of information) and the other party is the sender.  
The ‘send’ and ‘receive’ can actually be 
implemented by ‘grant’ and ‘access’ (the sender 
granting the access to the receiver, and the receiver 
accessing the information intended to be shared by 
the sender).  The general practices, such as simple 
rights as read-only, write-only or read-and-write, 
are to be adopted along with other more fine 
grained access control at such the best visibility can 
be obtained with the maximum protection of 
privacy. 
The general information sharing follows these 
similar steps: 
1. Data request of a DO – A request from a 
DO, the receiver for information is posted 
to an information portal. 
2. SUI-DS determines data location – The 
information portal queries the SUI-DS, 
and the data location pointers are returned. 
3. SOs matches privacy preference – The 
information requesting DO submits its 
privacy preference, and the information 
sender DO does the same.  Based on an 
authorization scheme, the characteristics 
of information sharing are determined. 
4. Exchange of information – The receiver 
obtains the information as intended by 
both parties with privacy and security 
ensured. 
 
Information sharing across platforms 
scenario 
We will discuss one typical scenario to better 
explain and illustrate CPPF. In this scenario we 
portray that the supply chain partners are in a cross 
platform environment as described by CPPF, 
trucker B of the retailer platform wants to obtain 
information of the carrier of the trader platform, e.g. 
delivery note (DN), as shown in Figure 3 with the 
thicker lines depicting the information sharing path. 
Previously, trucker B had to call or fax the trading 
company to obtain the DN, who in its turn had to 
obtain it from the carrier operator. However, with 
CPPF trucker B can access the DN via existing  
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Table 1: Data sensitivity 
 
retailer platform. In order to obtain the DN trucker 
B must go through the following steps: 
 
1. Data request of a DO – Trucker B is a 
3PC and in CPPF the SOs only are aware 
the DOs, as described by the information 
portal of CPPF. Therefore trucker B sends 
out a data request to the DC, as the DC is 
the data owner. The DC in its turn sends 
out a data request of the specific DN to the 
retailer platform.  
2.  SUI-DS determines data location – Thus 
the DC queries the retailer platform for the 
specific DN on behalf of trucker B. The 
retailer platform subsequently queries the 
SUI-DS, and the SUI-DS web service 
returns a pointer with the platform (trader 
platform) containing the specific DN.  
3. SOs matches privacy preference – The DO 
requester (DC) submits its privacy 
preference and the DO provider (trader) 
submits its privacy preference. In our 
scenario the privacy preference is a fixed 
relationship, by means of a contract, and 
the relationship predetermined a security 
scheme that only a translucent view, see 
below for an explanation of the translucent 
view, of DN should be shared to the DC.  
4. Exchange of information – Since the 
privacy preference allows a translucent 
view of the DN to be shared with the DC, 
the DC receives the translucent view DN 
information from the trader platform via 
its own retailer platform and passes the 
DN to trucker B.  
         In our scenario we consider that the DN data 
is stored on the platform and therefore can be 
shared with supply chain partners. Moreover, we 
propose three views of the DN (based on the data 
sensitivity) in our security scheme, namely 
transparent, translucent, and opaque [23]. In the 
current practice we usually either completely share 
the data (transparent) or not share the data at all 
(opaque). However, this might not be adequate to 
facilitate the needs of the supply chain and we 
therefore propose a third view, namely translucent. 
In the translucent view supply chain partners can 
share only selected/aggregated data. An illustrative 
simple version of the DN is shown in Table 1.  
 The translucent view provides trucker B with 
adequate information to anticipate and to prepare 
the transportation of the products, without 
disclosing sensitive information of the trading 
company (e.g. manufacturer name and price). With 
this view we can create a mutual benefit, where 
trucker B can plan their operations in advance and 
where the trading company does not have to worry 
about disclosing sensitive information.  
 
Concluding remarks 
In order to facilitate information sharing across 
entire supply chains, a solution is needed to 
connect the disjoined platforms. This study 
addressed the privacy and security issues of this 
solution. We have proposed a novel information 
sharing platform to safeguard confidential 
information shared across platforms. Literature has 
been reviewed and a case study has been utilized to 
portray a typical supply chain set up. The 
framework is designed in such a way that both 
fixed and dynamic partnership can be facilitated. 
Moreover, a scenario is developed to illustrate the 
framework. We believe that this framework can 
contribute to the development of solutions that can 
connect disjoined platforms for supply chain 
integration with proper protection for business 
confidentiality.  
 This study is an initial step that allows us to 
anticipate how cross platform privacy and security 
can be implemented and what issues it brings. 
Although CPPF has been demonstrated by the 
aforementioned scenario, it still lacks an actual 
implementation. Moreover, CPPF is based on a 
supply chain configuration and it therefore might 
not be applicable to all supply chains. However, 
CPPF is designed to handle both fixed and dynamic 
partnership and can therefore support many 
different supply chain partnerships. Moreover, 
there are still areas in the study that require further 
investigation to establish a holistic foundation for 
the privacy and security issues and concerns in 
CPPF. The following potential further investigation 
 Transparent Translucent Opaque 
Vendor Manufacturer XYZ 





ETA 01 January 2010 01 January 2010 - 
Quantity Product A – 50 pieces in 5 cartons 
Product B – 80 pieces in 4 cartons 
9 cartons - 
Gross 
weight 
Product A – 100kg 
Product B – 80kg 
100 – 200 kg - 
Price Product A - $25/piece 
Product B - $10/piece 
$10 - $ 30 per piece - 
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can be the suggested: Relation based access control 
method, the data characteristic models, and the 
privacy preference scheme.  
         CPPF is actually a part of our study to 
develop web services methodologies that allow 
information sharing across platforms. The study 
will continue to advance and in continuation a 
prototype will be developed. Technologies such as 
P3P (Platform for Enterprise Privacy Practices), 
EPAL (Enterprise Privacy Authorization 
Language), ISTPA (Internet Security & Trust 
Privacy Alliance), SAML (Security Assertion 
Markup Language), and XACML (eXtensible 
Access Control Markup Language) are currently 
being evaluated for implementation of the 
prototype in our study.  
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